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In some states, cognovit notes, or warrants of attorney,'
are widely used to strengthen the security of creditors, and
legislatures have shown their approval by enacting statutes
2
providing for the enforcement of the device in the courts.
Serious problems have arisen because other states have
found the device so offensive to their policies that they have
enacted statutes prohibiting its use.3
Suppose that A, a citizen and resident of Texas, in return
for a loan, gives B, also a citizen and resident of Texas, a
promissory note. Let us further suppose that B refuses to
lend the money to A unless the latter includes in the note
a provision authorizing any attorney at law to confess judgment against him. B, realizing that the courts of Texas
will not give effect to the cognovit provision, goes to Illinois
(although there are, no doubt, states nearer than Illinois
which would enforce the provision) ; there, an Illinois court
renders judgment for B and against A without giving
notice to A of the proceeding. B then returns to Texas and
seeks to obtain enforcement of the Illinois judgment by a
Texas court. On its face, the hypothetical transaction just
stated would seem to be of no validity; but, would not the
* 2nd Year Law Student, Duke University; V.P.I. 1946-1949.
1 Under the old common law, the warrant of attorney was disting-

uished from the cognovit note in that the former was not a part of the
promissory note but was a separate document; also, the warrant of
attorney was under seal, while a cognovit note was not. Irose v. Balla,
181 Ind. 491, 104 N.E. 851 (1914). The tendency today Is to use the
terms interchangeably.
2 For example, see ILL. STAT. Awrr., Sec. 104.050 (1949 Supp.).
3 See TEx. Civ. STAT., Art. 2224 (1950). See also, N. C. G. S. §25-11
(1943), which would seem to indicate that North Carolina disallows
cognovits; but Mofiarch Refrigerating Co. v. Farmers' Peanut Co., 74
F. 2d 790 (4th Cir. 1935), holds that the Statutory provision is merely
procedural, and does not prohibit use of cognovit notes. The cognovIt
device has the effect of cutting off the defenses of the maker; the extent
to which those defenses are cut off Is not within the purview of this
article.
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full faith and credit clause of the Constitution require that
Texas render judgment for B on the Illinois judgment?
Or suppose a suit is brought in Alabama on a judgment
rendered in Illinois, the judgment being rendered on a
cognovit note which is invalid by Alabama statute. In such
a case, where the notes were dated and made payable in
Illinois, though actually executed in Alabama, the court
said:
"It [the cognovit provision] was void under the
statute law of this state, and being void where entered into, it was everywhere, and of consequence
could not be relied upon to give jurisdiction to the
Illinois court."
And again:
"The warrant of attorney, upon which the Illinois court acted, was the only foundation for any
pretence that the defendant was a party to the
cause or had a day in court, and if such power was
void the jurisdiction was destroyed." 4
But in Barber Co. v. Hughes,5 the Indiana court took a
lifferent view. There the plaintiff was the assignee of a
cognovit note which had been signed in Indiana by a resident of that state for a debt owed the plaintiff's assignor,
a corporation doing business in the state of Illinois. The
Indiana statute declares such notes void and provides that
no court of that state shall aid or enforce the collection of
any judgment which may be rendered upon any judgment
obtained in any other state and founded on such a cognovit.
But, because of the Illinois contacts, the court held that the
law of Illinois applied, and of the cognovit it said:
"It constituted a voluntary waiver of the necessity for a personal service and became effective
when acted upon. Consent being thus given to the
Illinois court, in a manner recognized as valid
under its laws, the judgment rendered pursuant
thereto was entitled to full faith and credit everywhere and was properly recognized and enforced
in Indiana."
5

Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228 Ala. 554, 155 S.74 (1934).
223 Ind. 570, 63 N. E. 2d 417 (1945).
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The two cases just mentioned demonstrate that the outcome of the hypothetical case could be doubtful, although
its facts are, perhaps, indicative of what a just result would
be.
In a recent case, Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Company,6 petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit was denied by the Supreme Court.
The Alton Banking & Trust Company, executor of the deceased creditor, had obtained an Illinois court judgment on
a note which provided:
"If this note is not paid at maturity, we . . . do
hereby . . . empower any attorney of any Court
of Record to appear for us . . . at any time hereafter and confess a judgment without process
against us . . . in favor of the legal holder thereof . . ."
The defendant was living in Missouri at the time this judgment was rendered against him although he had been a
resident of Illinois at the time the note was issued. The
plaintiff sought enforcement of this judgment in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
jurisdiction being based on diversity of citizenship; that
court entered judgment upon a verdict for the plaintiff,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial proceedings of every other
State."'7 Is there anything about a judgment rendered on
a cognovit note, such as appears in the Turner case, which
excludes it from the effect of the provision just quoted? The
Court of Appeals thought not and cited Grim v. Crim8 to
support this view. That latter case seems to express the
position of a majority of the decisions; and although the
main.case is the only federal case which has cited it, a number of state courts have considered it an authoritative
opinion. 9
6 340

(1950).

'U.S.

Sec. 1.

U.S. 833 and 885
CONsT., Art. IV,
8 162 Mo. 554, 63 S.W.
9 See generally, Note,

489 (1901).
26 VA. L. R. 952 (1940).
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But it is the dissenting opinion of Justice Valiant in
Grim v. Grim, supra, which is of interest for the purpose
of this discussion. This dissent presents a view which
surprisingly few of the state courts most opposed to the
use of cognovits have utilized. The facts of the case were
that the defendant, a resident of Missouri, had, while in
the state of Ohio, executed a cognovit note to the plaintiff,
a resident of Ohio; under the authorization given, an attorney entered confession of judgment in an Ohio court
against the defendant, and the plaintiff brought action on
the judgment in the Missouri court. Justice Valliant said
that the question was one of jurisdiction; and of the confession of judgment entered by the attorney, -he said:
"Suppose there had been no such authorization
in the note, and an attorney at law, without any
authority from defendant whatever, had entered
to go . . .
his appearance and suffered judgment
[T]he decisions above cited 0 are authority for
saying that, if that judgment should be sued on
here, the defendant may avoid it by a plea showing that the court had no jurisdiction of his person. Now, the supposed case differs from the case
at bar only in this: that in that case there was no
semblance of authority to the pragmatical attorney, while here there is claimed to be authority.
But, if what is here claimed to be authority is no
authority, then there is no difference between the
cases."
A few remarks are necessary to clarify the dissenter's
position. A judgment rendered in one state, if valid in that
state, must be honored by another state; but, if the court
which rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of
the subject and the person, then the judgment is void
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and does not come within the full faith and credit clause.
The rule was stated in clear terms in Thompson v. Whitman," where Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court,
20D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165, 13 L. Ed. 648 (1850); Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
18 Wall. 457, 21 L. Ed. 897 (1874).
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said that neither the constitutional provision that full faith
and credit should be given in each state to the judicial
proceedings of every other state, nor the act of Congress
passed in pursuance thereof, prevented an inquiry into the
jurisdiction of the court which had rendered a judgment
offered in evidence. 12
Although Justices Black and Douglas were of the opinion
that it should have been granted, certiorari was denied by
the Supreme Court in Turner v. Aiton Banking & Trust
Company. A majority of the United States Supreme Court
thus denied review in a case where the due process question was disposed of by the single statement:
"Due process does not require notice where
rights are established in conformity with state
law."
13
As authority for this statement, the Court of Appeals
cited Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 4 and Griffin v. Griffin. 5 It is
the Griffin case which must be examined in order to find
support for the statement. In that case the action was for
the recovery of a judgment for arrears for alimony. In
1935 the plaintiff therein had recovered in the New York
Supreme Court a judgment against the petitioner for $18,493.64 in accrued installments of alimony and interest;
petitioner did receive notice and hearing in connection with
this judgment. Then in 1938, the New York Supreme
Court rendered a judgment against the petitioner ex parte,
without notice to him, for the sum of $25,382.75, which
sum included the amount of the 1935 judgment plus additional arrears and interest. Petitioner contended that the

" This rule is subject to an exception where the court rendering the
judgment has passed upon the question of its own jurisdiction upon a
contested hearing of that question. Of course, this exception would
be inapplicable in the cognovit note cases. See Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S.
32 (1938).
181 F.2d 899 (8th Cir. 1950).
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938). It seems clear that this case was cited for Its
rule that a federal court in enforcing State-created rights is required
to follow the State law. It seems unnecessary to stress that this rule
is operative only if the State law is constitutional.
5 327 U.S. 220 (1945).
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judgment was void for want of due process, and the case
ultimately arrived in the United States Supreme Court. It
was when that court was speaking of the $18,493.64 that
it said:
"Due process does not require that notice be
given before confirmation of rights theretofore
established in a proceeding of which adequate notice was given."
To spell this out, the petitioner contended that judgment
for the full amount of $25,382.75, which had been rendered
ex parte, was void; but the court answered that this was
not true, at least, to the extent of the $18,493.64.
But in Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Company, the
instant case, nothing that could be called "adequate notice"
was given. The rights were established only in conformity
with the Illinois statute which reads in part:
"Any person for a debt bona fide due may confess judgment by himself or attorney duly author16
ized either in term or vacation, without process.'
The Court of Appeals seems to have indulged in some circular reasoning here: the appellant was complaining that the
procedure by which his property was taken was without
due process of law because of the invalidity of the statute
authorizing it; the court then answered the due process
objection, without considering the validity or invalidity of
the statute, by saying that the proceeding was effectual
because the property was taken in conformity with the
statute.
The Supreme Court went a step further in the Griffin
case, supra, and while conceding that the original divorce
decree gave the petitioner notice that additional proceedings might occur because of his obligation to pay installments accruing under the decree, said:
"We find in this no ground for saying that due
process does not require notice of the time and place
of such further proceedings, inasmuch as they
undertook substantially to affect his rights in ways
in which the 1926 decree did not."
20

ILL. STAT.

ANN., Sec. 104.050 (1949 Supp.).
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In the main case, if it be said that the appellant had notice,
at the time when he authorized any attorney to appear for
him and confess judgment against him without process,
that the act authorized might at some time be performed,
does it follow that in waiving his right to be served with
process, he also effectually waived the right to "further
notice of the time and place" of the proceedings? Admittedly, if the authorization was to have the effect accorded
it by the court, then an affirmative answer is required to
this question. But it is submitted that the cases cited by
the court do not require such an answer, although this is
not to say that authority supporting the court's position
was unavailable.
Beginning with the proposition, for which justification
will subsequently be suggested, that a process which is unreasonable and unfair is prima facie not due process of
law; let us tentatively assume, in accordance with the views
of many legislatures and courts, that the cognovit process
is unreasonable and unfair. What arguments have been
accepted by the courts as sufficient to overcome this prima
facie case and support the constitutionality of the cognovit
process?
To begin with, federal decisions on the subject are very
scarce. The device has been "recognized and ruled upon by
the United States Supreme Court." 17 But this last statement shows a very careful choice of words which aptly
describes the lack of Supreme Court decisions absolutely
passing upon the constitutionality of cognovits. The next
question is, how would the Supreme Court justify the
cognovit constitutionally if it were squarely faced with the
question? The case of Frenchv. Willer18 suggests an answer
to this question by its statement that the
"practice of entering judgment in debt on warrants of attorney is very old;
so old that the date
19
of its origin is unknown."
17

Bower v. Casanave, 44 F. Supp. 501, 507 (S.D. N.Y 1941).
126 Ill. 711, 18 N.E. 811 (1888).
19 Teel v. Yost, 128 N.Y. 387, 28 N.E. 353 (1891), gives an excellent
history of warrants of attorney in New York and gives evidence of their
use in that state as early as 1774.
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The suggestion of that statement is the possible application of the "settled usages and modes" doctrine by which
a proceeding otherwise found wanting in due process is
justified. 20 An example of how this doctrine can be applied
to a proceeding which might otherwise be treated as inconsistent with due process is Ownby v. Morgan.21 There
a Delaware statute provided that, before a defendant to a
foreign attachment proceeding could contest the action, he
would be required to put up as security property equal in
value to that held under the attachment. The defendant in
that action possessed no property other than that attached
and thus was precluded from contesting the attachment.
The Supreme Court said:
"A procedure customarily employed, long before
the Revolution, in the commercial metropolis of
England, and generally adopted by the states as
suited to their circumstances and needs, cannot be
deemed inconsistent with due process of law."
It might be argued that the above statement could be used
to justify the constitutionality of cognovit notes. But the
argument seems too broad to be convincing. The fact that
a procedure was employed in England prior to the Revolution would seem to have little relation to its constitutionality today; indeed, the Revolution has often been thought
of as an event calculated to end certain legal procedures
which were considered to be oppressive. It is only when
a traditional procedure has been "generally adopted by
the states as suited to their circumstances and needs" that
a strong case in favor of its constitutionality is made out.
It is doubtful whether the cognovit note can meet this
latter test; for, in addition to the fact mentioned earlier
that the device is outlawed in many states, the courts in
general have shown little liking for cognovits and have
invalidated them, if not on due process grounds, 22 by strict
Murray v. Hoboken Land, etc. Co., 18 How. 272 (1855).
256 U.S. 94 (1921).
22 For a case implying that cognovits are lacking in due process, see
Bernard Gloeckler Co. v. Baker Co., Tex. Civ. App., 52 S.W. 2d 912
(1932).
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construction 23 where possible, and by refusal to extend their
use beyond the field of contracts. 24 These facts tend to suggest that the courts recognize that there is something inherently unfair in the device.
Having seen that the courts have given few reasons to
support their upholding of the cognovit note process, and
that there is some doubt that it could be supported even on
the ground of traditional acquiescence, it seems clear that
what the courts are really relying on is jurisdiction conferred by consent, 25 with the normal due process requirement of notice being deemed dispensed with by waiver.
This reliance on consent could not be questioned if the nineteenth-century standards of decision yet prevailed. But in
recent years the Supreme Court has significantly departed
from the rigid scheme of jurisdictional bases previously
recognized, mainly because the concept of "consent" had
been strained beyond the breaking point. Before speculating on the possibility and practicability of applying the
modern approach to the cognovit note situation, an examination of some of the cases illustrating the recent departure
might be illuminating.
Suppose a motorist of one state runs over someone while
traveling through a second state. It seems clear that it
would be just to require the motorist to defend himself in
the courts of the state wherein the accident occurred; however, it is also clear that the fulfillment of the consent requirement would in rare cases be an actuality. An excel13 One of the many cases expressing this doctrine is Nardi v. Ponsatte, 46 F. 2d 347 (1931). It is true that in that case there was some
evidence of fraud. But aside from that, the court held that where one
authorizes any attorney of any court of record to appear and confess
judgment against him, he is not bound by the acts of one who was not
shown in the proceedings to have been an attorney of a court of record,
but was only shown to have been an attorney.
21 See French v. Willer, 126 Ill. 711, 18 N.E. 811 (1888), where the
court says that the practice of entering judgment by confession upon
warrant of attorney, without process, is not applicable in actions of tort.
I For the usual bases of jurisdiction, see Scott Jurisdiction Over

2onresidents Doing Business Within a state, 32 H.&v. L. R. 871 (1919).
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lent case for showing two of the steps taken by the courts
in getting around this requirement is Hess v. Pawloski:26
"[I] n advance of the operation of a motor vehicle on its highway by a nonresident, the state may
require him to appoint one of its officials as his
agent on whom process may be served in proceedings growing out of its use. Kane v. New Jersey,
242 U.S. 160. That case recognizes power of the
state to exclude a nonresident until the formal appointment is made. And, having the power so to
exclude, the state may declare that the use of the
highway is the equivalent of the appointment of
the registrar as agent on whom process may be
served."
It can be seen that the courts in effect have abandoned
"consent" as a requirement of jurisdiction in favor of a
more practical and realistic approach which treats the
motorist as within the jurisdiction of the state in question
when the circumstances seem to justify his treatment as
such.
The broadening of jurisdiction to include foreign corporations has also taken place by gradual steps. The first
step was the formulation of the theory that a state could
exclude a foreign corporation entirely since corporations
were not deemed "persons" for the purpose of the privileges and immunities clause. Then it was decided that if a
corporation was found to be present within a state, it was
said to have agreed to certain conditions of entry, among
these, consent to jurisdiction. But even after these steps
in the direction of a practical solution to the jurisdiction
problem, the courts seemed to feel bound by strict definitions of "present" and "presence." As pointed out by Justice Learned Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,2T this
did not lead to a uniform line of decisions. The opinion
just mentioned liberalized this strict adherence to definition by giving a "continuous dealings" test which would
insure more practical results than the former formalistic
- 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
45 F. 2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
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as is shown
approach. The view today is even more liberal
2
by InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington: 8
"[D]ue process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
But the difference in the two approaches can best be seen
in application to specific facts. Suppose that the state of
Virginia, under its "Blue Sky Law," ordered a Nebraska
insurance association to cease operations until, among other
things, it consented to suit by service of process on the
Secretary of the Commonwealth. The Nebraska association
had for several years been conducting business by mail
with some seven or eight hundred customers in Virginia.
Now, the defendants challenge the jurisdiction of Virginia,
and move to quash the service of summons, which was sent
by registered mail. Under the old and strict approach to
jurisdiction, it would be difficult to come out with the result that the defendants were within the jurisdiction of
Virginia; to do so it would have been necessary to find that
they were "present" in Virginia and they had thus "consented" to jurisdiction. But, looking at the amount of
business conducted by the association in Virginia, it would
seem that it should be treated as within that state's jurisdiction. Under the facts given, the Supreme Court did
reach such a result as that last suggested in TravelersHealth
29
Assn. v. Virginia:
"But where business activities reach out beyond
one state and create continuing relations and obligations with citizens of another state, courts need
not resort to a fictional 'consent' in order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in the
latter state."
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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And of the old approach, the court said:
"Metaphysical concepts of 'implied consent' and
'presence' in a state should not be solidified into a
constitutional barrier against Virginia's simple,
direct and fair plan for service of process on the
Secretary of the Commonwealth."
In still another related area of jurisdiction, form and
formula appear to be breaking down in favor of a more
realistic approach; that is in connection with the nonresident individual doing business within a state. The process
of reasoning applied to foreign corporations was, in this
area, found to be inapplicable because the individual was
protected by the privileges and immunities provision; thus
he could not be excluded from the state entirely, and so
there could be no conditions on his entering the state. But
the same broadening of jurisdiction is taking place. In
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,30 an Iowa statute was involved
which provided that service could be made on an agent of
an individual or corporation doing business in the state in
all actions growing out of or connected with the business.
The defendant there was an individual who resided in New
York and who conducted a business of selling securities, one
of the areas of his sales being Iowa where an agent conducted the business. The defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the Iowa court which served process on his Iowa
agent in an action arising out of a sales contract. The
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, but
indicated its intention to limit its holding to that set of
facts; however, it seems doubtful that this limitation will
long remain.
Fairness and justice seems to have been the chief guiding lines for the courts in broadening the jurisdiction of
state courts so as to include foreign corporations, nonresident motorists and, to a limited degree, nonresident individuals. This has taken place following a recognition by
the courts of the fact that adherence to the conceptualistic
bases of jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of par294 U.S. 623 (1935).
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ticular courts certain actions which should not have been
so excluded. The most logical step next to be taken, would
seem to be the narrowing of the jurisdiction of state courts
over certain of the cognovit note cases. If at first glance
it appears an illogical step to move from a disregard of
implied consent in broadening jurisdiction to a disregard
of prior expressed consent in narrowing jurisdiction, it is
submitted that the logical nature of the move is more apparent upon the realization that in each instance the goal
is a more practical approach to jurisdiction. It is true that
the desirability of disregarding "implied consent" as a
criterion for obtaining a legal conclusion is ordinarily greater than it is for disregarding "express consent"; but it
would seem that the economic duress behind the express
consent in the cognovit situation should place it on a level
with "implied consent" as a fiction.
Probably the outcome of cases such as the principal case
of Turner v. Alton Banking & Trust Company would be no
different under this approach. But, in cases where the
whole cognovit transaction takes place in a state expressly
disallowing the transaction, and where the state court rendering the questioned judgment has no grounds for exercising its jurisdiction other than the fact that the holder
of the note has sought a favorable court, there would, under
this approach, be a different result. In addition to situations like that just mentioned, a number of cases falling
somewhere between that situation and the main case could
well be found to have offended "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."
Because of the conflicting nature of the state statutes
concerning cognovit notes, the problems occurring from the
use of the device seem to be on the incline. In view of this
fact, it does not seem unlikely that the Supreme Court will
at some time be faced with a strong case for showing the
unfairness of the transaction; when and if that happens,
this writer suggests that the traditional bases for the exercise of jurisdiction may be contracted.

